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Abstract

Network security professionals improve confidentiality and integrity of information technology
resources when they incorporate encryption schemes into the transmission of network packets
across their respective infrastructures. Ironically, network engineers and administrators that
incorporate encryption strategies across their infrastructures must simultaneously confront the
limitations of end-to-end encrypted network packets inasmuch as they severely impair visible,
defensible network architectures. This project demonstrates how security professionals charged
with maintaining network visibility can deploy encryption across their topologies without fear of
compromising their ability to capture – then fully analyze – network traffic. In so doing,
information technology industry practitioners and researchers may confidently move forward
with the task of maturing a framework for maintaining defensibility in encrypted network
environments.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Framework \frãm-, wərk\: a simplified description of a complex entity or process.
www.websters-dictionary.org

Value and Importance of Frameworks
Thoughtfully designed frameworks reduce complexity. Business practitioners and
research professionals alike create, analyze, refine, and reuse frameworks for the purpose of
clarifying otherwise obscure or unwieldy activities. For example, IBM business systems planner
John Zachman (1987) revolutionized the modern corporate landscape when he proposed what
matured into a widely adopted (and often emulated) framework for the effective and efficient
integration of information technology (IT) assets into day-to-day business operations. Similarly,
contemporary software engineers the world over rely on Agile, Waterfall, or Spiral frameworks
(to name a few) in the process of designing and producing highly complex yet reliable software
and database applications that government agencies, private businesses, and individual
consumers find indispensable (Ambler, n.d. & Elucidata, n.d.).
Nowhere do frameworks prove their value more obviously than to those professionals
charged with architecting, implementing, and maintaining complex technology systems. As
Jeanne Ross (2004 & 2005) concluded, the process of reducing complexity not only saves time
and money, it also results in improved competitive advantage for those willing to understand and
practice the nuances of industry-applicable frameworks. In the case of IT, properly implemented
frameworks further minimize unnecessary expenditures, reveal flaws in design assumptions,
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improve operational efficiency, identify points of potential failure, and mitigate future risk
(Bernard, 2005).

Value and Importance of Network Encryption
Encryption serves as a fundamental cornerstone of computer network security (Pfleeger
& Pfleeger, 2007). Thoroughly engineered encryption schemes provide confidentiality and
integrity of data packets traversing both wired and wireless network topologies. Without robust
encryption algorithms, such modern services as on-line banking, electronic commerce, and
remote telecommunications would all but cease to exist.
While encryption supports a multitude of important activities 21st-century technology
users now find indispensable, nefarious individuals and/or criminal syndicates can easily employ
the same encryption methodologies originally intended to fuel global economies of the future to
(instead) initiate, perpetuate, and obfuscate their own movements and activities from even the
most vigilant crime fighters. It logically follows that if legitimate financial institutions can (and
do) use encryption to protect millions of legitimate transactions totaling trillions of dollars,
technologically inclined thieves can (and do) also use the same encryption strategies to hide their
own illicit initiatives without raising even the slightest real-time suspicions. In this respect, the
value and benefits originally associated with encryption quickly become liabilities that have the
very real potential of severely harming individual consumers, business organizations,
government agencies, and peace-keeping operations around the world.

Problem Statement – The Encryption Dichotomy
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Security professionals charged with protecting corporate infrastructures, customer
information, business partner relationships, and/or national secrets can ill-afford to ignore or
minimize the important role encryption plays in securing both logical and physical digital assets.
Because of its inherent value to security architectures of every size and configuration, encryption
will continue to sustain the core activities of modern economies far into the foreseeable future.
Nonetheless, technology professionals must simultaneously acknowledge that end-to-end
data encryption across their respective topologies constitutes a serious problem primarily
because end-to-end data encryption necessarily undermines network security. Richard Bejtlich
(2005) asserted that the concept of defensibility – where network engineers and administrators
design and maintain network topologies best suited to resist unauthorized intrusions – most
appropriately defines comprehensive computer network security. Bejtlich further elaborated that
defensible computer networks must easily facilitate visibility or the ability for authorized
personnel to meaningfully monitor all data traffic that traverses a given network topology.
That visibility leads to defensibility, which finally leads to security, accentuates a
fundamental problem with any end-to-end data encryption methodology: end-to-end data
encryption severely constrains attempts on the parts of authorized personnel to meaningfully
inspect and analyze network traffic (Bejtlich, 2005). Nowhere does the dichotomy of
encryption's inherent benefits and liabilities more critically apply than to the authorized
inspection and analysis of network traffic generated by unauthorized network users. If
unauthorized intruders use robust encryption schemes to obscure their movements and activities,
even the most sophisticated and rigorous network monitoring strategies will prove wholly
ineffective.

NETWORK ENCRYPTION FRAMEWORK

11

A Framework for Resolving the Encryption Dichotomy
Network security engineers and administrators that successfully capitalize on the benefits
of data encryption (i.e., increased confidentiality and integrity) while simultaneously minimizing
its concurrent risks (i.e., decreased visibility and defensibility) stand to best thwart attempts of
unauthorized intrusion and subsequent ex-filtration of proprietary information. Instead of
limping through the network security landscape with an Achille's heel, security professionals that
resolve the encryption dichotomy brandish double-edge swords that prove that much more
effective at securing digital assets.
Unfortunately, network security professionals sincere about resolving the encryption
dichotomy have very few resources at their disposal when trying to implement the most secure
yet visible encryption architectures across their topologies. To be sure, an abundance of books,
journal articles, and on-line resources explain the mathematic principles behind encryption,
detail specific encryption algorithms and associated network protocols, or outline design
principles of secure computer networks, but no framework – no simplified description of an
otherwise complex process – exists upon which network engineers and administrators may rely
to maintain visibility in their encrypted network environments.

Significance
A framework formulated to improve network defensibility through full-content analysis
of encrypted network traffic would prove invaluable. Understanding and implementing the
subtleties of contemporary encryption algorithms based on complex mathematic operations can
prove challenging enough. Understanding how to integrate the same complex operations across
an enterprise while also maintaining visibility (and, therefore, improving defensibility and
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security) can prove more challenging still. A thoughtfully designed framework has the very real
potential of minimizing such challenges and takes significant strides towards resolving the
encryption dichotomy.
Importantly, the significance of such a framework extends beyond the mere
simplification of an otherwise complex challenge. In addition to improving enterprise-wide
security, a framework for maintaining visibility in encrypted network environments carries with
it all the implied benefits generally associated with framework implementation (e.g., improved
design, decreased waste, mitigated risk, etc.). Moreover, such a framework stands to improve
the competitive advantage and market position of those organizations willing to adopt and
practice said framework.

Project Objective and Limitations
Successful analysis of encrypted network traffic ultimately requires knowledge of and
access to the software keys originally employed in the process of converting clear-text (i.e.,
easily discernible and understandable) data into cypher-text (i.e. obscure and incomprehensible)
data (see Chapter 3). Therefore, a worthwhile framework dedicated to resolving the encryption
dichotomy must (at a minimum) adequately address encryption key storage and retrieval.
This thesis project makes a contribution towards a forthcoming encryption/decryption
framework by analyzing critical hardware and software encryption components commonly
deployed across network topologies for the purpose of determining the degree to which they
support encryption key storage and retrieval methods. As such, the eventual development of a
framework for maintaining defensibility across encrypted network environments begins by
answering the following research questions: will analysis of critical hardware and software
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encryption components commonly deployed across network topologies support the host-to-host
decryption process thereby demonstrating practical the eventual development of a framework for
maintaining defensibility across encrypted network environments?
This thesis project intends to formulate the beginnings of a working, viable encryption
framework upon which the security community may confidently rely as the IT industry
maneuvers towards reaping the rewards of encryption while simultaneously addressing inherent
risks associated with the very same. However, developing and publishing an exhaustive
framework that comprehensively resolves the encryption dichotomy will require extensive future
research investment from private businesses, government agencies, and academic institutions.
Although this project marks an initial step in the direction of creating a much-needed framework,
it does not result in a finalized working framework. The resolution of a full-functioning
framework model falls to research practitioners representing a variety of market sectors. Chapter
6 of this paper proposes topics for future research that have the potential of contributing towards
the maturation of an encryption/decryption framework.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review

Developments in Network Encryption Research
Because of encryption's pivotal role in computer network security architectures, industry
practitioners, academic researchers, technology companies, and government agencies
representing a variety of skills and experiences have published copious volumes of information
dedicated to topics ranging from fundamental encryption mechanics (Lewand, 2000) to complex
trust models based on encrypted authorization (Liu, 2008). Forouzan (2008) and Burnett &
Paine (2004) focused their attentions differentiating between symmetric and asymmetric bloc
cyphers and outlining encryption-based network protocols like IPsec and SSL. The System
Administration, Networking, and Security (SANS) Institute (Forward, 2002 & Oxenhandler,
2003) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (Frankel, 2010) both suggested
deployment strategies for encryption methodologies across small-scale and enterprise-wide
computer networks, while Schneier (1996) provided detailed instructions for software engineers
charged with integrating encryption algorithms into their computer programs.
Although network security professionals find value in each of the above technical
resources, they serve little use for those individuals and teams of specialists responsible for
maintaining visible computer network topologies predominated by end-to-end encryption
protocols. Both Mackey (2003) and Ciampia (2009) eluded to critical network encryption design
features that have the potential of proving useful in visible, encrypted network environments, but
they failed to provide a blueprint so others could implement their advice. Even Bejtlich (2005, p.
618) – an ardent supporter of visible, defensible, secure network – acknowledged encrypted
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network packets have the potential of thwarting network forensics investigations, yet he stopped
short of articulating a working resolution to the encryption dichotomy.
Within the past half-decade, a few academics have made indirect contributions that could
indirectly benefit a framework for maintaining visibility in encrypted network environments.
Wright (2006) and Gebski (2006) recommended inferencing techniques and protocol signature
identification to ascertain the intent of electronic messages. In a similar fashion, Koch (2010)
proposed command sequence analysis combined with probability algorithms as a method for
hypothesizing (then acting upon) network communications packets assumed to carry malicious
payloads.
Genuine though the intentions of the above approaches may be, they fail to consider
storage and retrieval of encryption keys, which – by extension – predicates meaningful fullcontent data analysis of computer network traffic. Without visibility of the entire,
unadulterated contents of any given network packet, network security professionals must rely on
best-effort (i.e., best-guess) strategies for thwarting attacks against their infrastructures. While
best-effort strategies certainly have their place within the IT community, they prove counter
productive to organizations defending their courses of action in legal proceedings that place
higher price tags on verifiable actions rather than assumptions of intent.
Review of available resources dedicated to modern computer encryption techniques and
their applicability to network security reveals a fundamental deficiency: network security
engineers and administrators lack even a basic framework for integrating end-to-end data
encryption into their respective network topologies that simultaneously supports the critical
ability to meaningfully perform as-needed, full-content analysis of encrypted data payloads.
This thesis project intends to make a contribution towards resolving this deficiency.
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Chapter 3 – Decryption = Algorithm + Keys

The Unhappy Marriage of Encryption and Defensible Networks
In order to preserve network visibility (and, by extension, network defensibility), security
administrators must maintain the ability to dissect network packets within their respective
topologies and meaningfully ascertain their individual payloads. Of course, network traffic
transmitted as clear-text (i.e., without encryption) presents very little challenge to security
personnel with access to multiple capture locations and software tools (e.g., Wireshark)
brilliantly engineered to capture and parse network packet content.
Unfortunately, neither the most efficiently designed network topologies nor the most
sophisticated forensics tools have any practical use when trying to dissect fully encrypted data
packets transmitted and received by individual workstations and/or servers. (Note: This
condition has everything to do with access to encryption keys needed to decrypt network packets
and will garnish detailed attention in the following sections of this chapter.) In these situations,
encrypted network traffic looks like nothing more than random, nonsensical characters that
necessarily prevent meaningful interpretation. Table 1 (next page) compares an unencrypted
network message to its encrypted counterpart and further illustrates the burden of trying to
meaningfully interpret encrypted messages intercepted as they traverse network topologies.
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Unencrypted Network Message
(also known as clear text)
Start

Same Network Message Encrypted
(also known as cypher text)
→

Finish

bb9ca9aa479de85cb80397ebe29742f67163182e
01941f1c05b59a4469632c6ecc869012ba3d0462
Table 1: Comparison of a clear-text message against the same message after encryption using
DES, a well-publicized and commonly employed encryption algorithm. See Appendix A for a
detailed explanation of references and steps used to convert the above clear-text message into its
encrypted, cypher-text counterpart.
I'm ready to install computer viruses!

Using Table 1 (accompanied by Appendix A) as a simple yet accurate working example,
the profound implications of encrypted traffic for defensible network infrastructures become
glaringly obvious: fully executed host-to-host encryption algorithms scramble network packet
payloads to such degrees that security administrators loose practical visibility into the traffic that
traverses their organizations' network backbones and associated trunks. Lack of visibility has
very few negative implications in trusted environments where all users behave as they should,
but lack of visibility proves disastrous in environments where unscrupulous computer and
network hackers so much as intend to lurk.

Importance of Encryption Keys – An Encryption Primer
Encryption algorithms perform mathematic operations on clear-text data to the point
where the clear-text data becomes unrecognizable cypher text (as exemplified in Table 1). After
encryption at the point of origin, computers and cooperating network devices transmit cypher
text to a destination (usually another computer) that then must employ the original encryption
algorithm to unscramble the cypher text into discernible clear-text messages (Burnett & Paine,
2001).
However, encryption algorithms themselves do not insure confidentiality and integrity of
scrambled messages. After all, encryption algorithms are well documented, and anyone willing
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to invest a little research energy can learn critical mathematic operations performed by a given
encryption algorithm, then use the information learned to decode any and all cypher text
generated through use of the algorithm(s) in question.
The general availability and access to encryption algorithms necessitates that the overall
success of encryption depends on a secret variable that encryption algorithms include in their
otherwise ubiquitously publicized mathematic operations. This secret variable – known as an
encryption key – helps perform the calculations that ultimately result in cypher text.
As applied to the malicious network message introduced in Table 1, an XOR operation
(see Appendix B) of the original clear-text message against a predefined encryption key resulted
in a fully encrypted network message. Table 2 (below) more accurately depicts the encryption
process outlined in Table 1, particularly because Table 2 includes the working encryption key
that ultimately resulted in the unintelligible cypher text introduced in Table 1.
Unencrypted Network
Message
(also known as clear text)
Start

Encryption Key

→

XOR operation

Same Network Message
Encrypted
(also known as cypher text)
→

Finish

bb9ca9aa479de85cb80397ebe297
42f67163182e01941f1c05b59a44
69632c6ecc869012ba3d0462
Table 2: Encryption algorithms require encryption keys to convert clear-text messages into cypher
text. See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of references and steps used to convert the above
clear-text message into its encrypted, cypher-text counterpart.
I'm ready to install computer
viruses!

3b3898371520f75e

Encryption only works when both (or all) parties involved in the transmission and receipt
of cypher text have access to the encryption algorithm and encryption key(s) used to scramble
the original clear-text message. Absence of either the algorithm or the key(s) at the endpoint
receiving electronic messages – or the collection point used to capture and record network traffic
– results in worthless messages, primarily because the receiving party (or capturing party, in the
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case of network surveillance) cannot properly reverse the XOR process and decode the
transmitted cypher text into something meaningful.
Referencing the sample clear-text network message introduced in Table 1, reversing the
XOR operation of the cypher text message against the exact same encryption keys decodes the
encrypted network packet into something meaningful and clearly reveals the malicious intent of
the cypher-text message (see Table 3).

Start

Same Network Message
Decrypted
(also known as clear text)

Encryption Key

Encrypted Network
Message
(also known as cypher text)

(NOTE: Same key
and mathematic
operation used in
Table 2)
→

XOR operation

→

Finish

bb9ca9aa479de85cb80397ebe29742
I'm ready to install computer
f67163182e01941f1c05b59a446963
3b3898371520f75e
viruses!
2c6ecc869012ba3d0462
Table 3: Encryption only works when both operation(s) and key(s) originally used to encrypt the
message are also used to decrypt the message.

However, alterations to any (or all) encryption keys – or applying a different mathematic
operation (e.g., AND instead of XOR) to the decoding process – necessarily results in messages
that severely hinder meaningful interpretation with as much frustration as the original encrypted
message. Table 4 (next page) simply yet accurately illustrates the wholly ineffective outcome of
the decryption process using an altered encryption key. Likewise, Table 5 (next page) simply
yet accurately illustrates the wholly ineffective outcome of the decryption process using an AND
operation instead of an XOR operation.

NETWORK ENCRYPTION FRAMEWORK
Encrypted Network
Message
(also known as cypher text)
Start

20

Altered
Encryption Key;
Same Operation
→

XOR operation

Same Network Message
Decrypted
(also known as clear text)
Finish

→

bb9ca9aa479de85cb80397ebe29742
¬X_q#ìâ×0_v>SàíÀ0#b1SêìÞ0v
f67163182e01941f1c05b59a446963
e57f0251738983b3
4#©õÚ0q40¨£0
2c6ecc869012ba3d0462
Table 4: During the decryption process, reliance on a key different than the key originally used to
scramble the clear-text message results in an equally indiscernible final message.

Encrypted Network
Message
(also known as cypher text)
Start

Same Encryption
Key; Different
Operation
→

AND operation

Same Network Message
Decrypted
(also known as clear text)
→

Finish

bb9ca9aa479de85cb80397ebe29742
0#0####C0##p##e##0#0##tÃ
f67163182e01941f1c05b59a446963
3b3898371520f75e
###Q##d0###Q##00
2c6ecc869012ba3d0462
Table 5: Similarly, during the decryption process, reliance on a mathematic operation different
than the mathematic operation originally used to scramble the clear-text message results in an
equally indiscernible final message.

Ineffective Network Surveillance in Encrypted Environments
Importantly, this basic deciphering formula (decryption = algorithm + keys) holds true
even for legitimate, trustworthy security administrators charged with the responsibility of
maintaining visible, defensible, and secure computer networks. If security professionals engaged
in network surveillance fail to correctly identify either (or both) the encryption algorithm(s) and
encryption key(s) originally used to scramble network traffic, their efforts will prove utterly
ineffective and wholly benign (as exhibited in Tables 4 and 5 above).
It's equally worth noting that failure on the part of security professionals to decipher
encrypted network messages that traverse network topologies (due to inaccurate identification of
either the encryption algorithm and/or encryption keys) does not render network messages
ineffectual or less potent once they arrive at their destination. If a destination computer receiving
encrypted network packets employs the same encryption algorithm and encryption keys used by
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the sending computer to encrypt the original message, the receiving computer will correctly
decrypt the network packet and act upon its payload, despite the fact that security administrators
successfully captured (but failed to decipher) the malicious message as it negotiated its way
across the network topology. The fact remains, an encrypted computer virus is still a computer
virus that will unleash havoc once transmitted, decrypted, and then executed at its final
destination.
Figure 1 (next page) depicts a completely ineffective network surveillance scenario. In
Figure 1, a network security administrator successfully captured the encrypted network packet
introduced in Table 1. However, the network security administrator possessed an encryption key
different than the key used by the sending computer to originally scramble the transmitted
network message. As such, the security professional falls into a condition best exemplified by
Table 4 because he/she cannot properly decode the network message. Conversely, the receiving
computer possessed both the encryption algorithm and encryption key used by the sending
computer to scramble the network message; consequently, the receiving computer properly
decoded the network message originally transmitted by the sending computer. In the simple
scenario illustrated in Figure 1, the security professional monitoring network traffic had precious
little information to guide his/her next steps in defending technology assets while the receiving
computer clearly understood what malicious actions follow.
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Figure 1: An ineffective network surveillance scenario in which a network security
administrator cannot successfully decode an encrypted network message. In the
illustration above, the network message happens to be malicious, but the network
security administrator has no defensive recourse because he/she cannot meaningfully
ascertain the message's intent.

Effective Network Surveillance in Encrypted Environments
This chapter, with the inclusion of explanations, tables, and illustrations, merely serves to
establish that visibility, defensibility, and security of physical and logical IT assets in encrypted
network environments hinges on the ability of network defense practitioners to properly collect,
manage, and apply the original encryption keys used to convert clear-text messages into cypher
text that eventually propagates through a given topology. With access to the original encryption
keys, network security professionals can meaningfully decrypt encrypted network packets,
quickly identify malicious messages of all varieties and, more importantly, take proactive steps
to thwart the execution of malicious code as illustrated in Figure 2 (next page).
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Figure 2: An effective network surveillance scenario in which a network security
administrator successfully decoded a network message. In the above illustration, the
network security administrator can now appropriately respond to the malicious action
uncovered as a result of having properly deciphered the network message.

Because encryption keys play such pivotal roles in maintaining defensible network
infrastructures, any contribution to formulating a viable framework that resolves the encryption
dichotomy must first identify how network security professionals exercise their ability to collect
and correctly apply encryption keys for the purpose of meaningfully decoding encrypted network
packets. By analyzing critical hardware and software encryption components commonly
deployed across computer network topologies, this thesis project will explore the possibility of
network packet encryption key retrieval, the success of which constitutes a critical cornerstones
upon which a future, full-functioning framework for resolving the encryption dichotomy will
emerge.
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Chapter 4 – Research Methodology

Action Research
As a general concept, researchers rely on research methodologies to systematize their
procedures for generating (or observing), collecting, interpreting, and finalizing data considered
sufficiently necessary to answer their respective research questions (Leedy, 2005). While
convention allows for the adoption of more than one methodology per research project, the
defining principles and characteristics of action research (AR) most appropriately applied to this
initial contribution towards a framework for maintaining defensibility in encrypted network
environments.
In outlining the nuances of AR, Richard Baskerville (1999) explained that, by definition,
AR research projects include three critical steps: 1) action planning, 2) action taking, and 3)
evaluating. In the action planning step, researchers develop working prototypes for the
expressed purpose of solving problems under investigation. Action taking effectively requires
researchers to deploy their prototypes and collect resulting data, and evaluating simply involves
analyzing data generated by prototypes to determine the degree to which they answer research
questions. Importantly, Baskerville (p. 17) concluded that AR practitioners could apply results
(both positive and negative) culminating from the action planning, action taking, and evaluating
steps to guide the formulation and revision of theoretical frameworks, an envisioned final goal of
this research project.
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Alistar Cockburn (2003, p. 14) prescribed action research (AR) methodology for those
researchers intent on “[improving] practitioners' practice”. Because a framework for maintaining
defensibility in encrypted network environments has the very real potential of improving the
processes and procedures of network engineers and administrators engaged in the practice of
maintaining visible computer network topologies that also include host-to-host encryption
techniques, AR even more appropriately applied to this thesis project and, therefore, served as a
substantive guide for its completion.

Action Planning – Prototype Creation
Consistent with AR methodology, formulating a viable framework that resolves the
encryption dichotomy first requires prototyping a lab environment that includes 1) network
nodes (i.e., computers) for originating and receiving network traffic, 2) an encryption scheme for
converting clear-text network packets into cypher text, 3) a collection node that captures
encrypted traffic, and 4) techniques for reversing the encryption process and revealing encrypted
network traffic payloads. Figure 3 (next page) depicts the prototype network topology
constructed for the purpose of resolving the research problem articulated for this thesis project.
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Figure 3: The logical layout of the prototype network constructed for
resolving the research problem presented in this paper.

More than just integrating technology equipment for the expressed purpose of encrypting,
transmitting, capturing, and deciphering network packets, the prototype network depicted in
Figure 3 incorporates the majority of critical components considered necessary to relay
electronic messages (encrypted or otherwise) between individual computers. At a minimum,
computer networks – regardless of their intended purpose or physical footprint – require 1)
individual nodes that communicate one with another, 2) network medium (either wired or
wireless) upon which individual nodes place electronic messages to be transmitted to other nodes
on the network, 3) dedicated switching equipment that facilitates efficient routing and
transportation of electronic messages across network medium, 4) and communications protocols
that govern how and when individual nodes package then transmit their respective electronic
messages (Newton, 2006).
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Because of its configuration – specifically with regards to the inclusion of A) encryption
hardware and software and B) its general applicability to logical network topologies deployed
and maintained by even the largest and most geographically diverse organizations – the network
prototype architected for this project serves as a viable environment suited for answering the
research question posed for this project. In answering the research question, network security
professionals stand to enhance their ability to adequately resolve the encryption dichotomy, the
value of which manifests itself as improved confidentiality and integrity of IT resources.

Procedure
As detailed in Chapter 3, successful analysis of encrypted network traffic ultimately
requires knowledge of and access to the encryption key(s) originally employed in the process of
converting clear-text messages into cypher text. The Access Point (AP) depicted in Figure 3
serves as the encryption key repository responsible for orchestrating the encryption of network
traffic across the prototype topology that, subsequently, further facilitates eventual analysis of
network traffic captured by the Network Traffic Collection Node (NTCN).
After configuring Node 1 (N1) and Node 2 (N2) with the same encryption key stored in
the AP, N1 will transmit a malicious network message (“I'm ready to install
computer viruses!” – no quotes) specifically addressed to N2 but over common
communications medium shared by all devices on the network. Importantly, N1 will employ the
encryption algorithm and encryption key delimited by the AP to transform the original, clear-text
message into cypher text just prior to transmission; as such, the malicious message will traverse
the network topology as packets containing nonsensical data to any device not sharing both the
encryption algorithm and key.
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Once the encrypted (yet still malicious) message arrives at N2, N2 will successfully
reverse the encryption process using the encryption algorithm and key shared by N1 and the AP.
Effective retransformation of N1's original message from cypher text back to clear text will
automatically give N2 the advantage of clearly understanding the intent of N1's future actions.
Using software tool tcpdump previously installed on the NTCN, the NTCN will capture
and locally store all host-to-host traffic traversing the network topology, including the encrypted
network message originating from N1 and destined for N2. After capturing all network traffic,
the NTCN will then rely on previously installed software tool Wireshark to graphically
rebuild the network capture file locally stored to the NTCN. Wireshark's intuitive graphical
user interface improves the efficiency at which network security professionals identify, dissect,
and analyze host-to-host messages embedded in network capture files (Bejtlich, 2005).
Despite their collective value and potency as network monitoring and security tool, no
amount of sophistication exempts tcpdump and Wireshark from the basic deciphering
formula (decryption = algorithm + keys). While network security professionals may rely on
tcpdump and Wireshark to trap, dissect, and analyze network messages, reconstructed
encrypted network messages remain indiscernible cypher text up to the point where some
procedure evokes the original encryption algorithm and key(s) to reverses the encryption
process. Until such time as the applicable encryption key(s) decrypt their associated network
messages, even powerful software tools like tcpdump and Wireshark cannot properly
decode encrypted network packets into clear-text messages against which network security
administrators may properly act.
Scenario 1
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In the first procedural scenario devised for this project, the NTCN will capture and
rebuild network traffic without the benefit of knowing the encryption algorithm and key
configured into N1, N2, and the AP. Fundamental encryption principles suggest that without
prior knowledge of the common encryption algorithm and key shared by N1, N2, and the AP, the
NTCN (through the use of Wireshark) will unpack meaningless network messages that
necessarily thwart reasonable courses of defensive action on the part of a network security
professional charged with meaningful analysis of network traffic.
Scenario 2
Network security professionals intent on resolving the encryption dichotomy must
maintain parity with network hosts receiving encrypted network messages. The attainment of
such parity requires network security professionals – just like network hosts receiving encrypted
network messages and successfully reversing the encryption process – to employ the same
encryption key(s) stored in network equipment originally responsible for orchestrating
encrypting network traffic.
In the second procedural scenario devised for this project, the NTCN will rebuild network
traffic using Wireshark but, instead, will also administratively access the AP for the purpose
of learning its configured encryption algorithm and retrieving its stored encryption key.
Fundamental encryption principles suggest that correct identification of the AP's encryption
algorithm and proper application of the AP's encryption key will result in the NTCN's ability to
successfully decipher N1's malicious network messages.

Procedural Technique
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Answering the research question devised for this thesis project depends on the degree to
which commonly available technology components integrated into the prototype network
topology support (or fail to support) host-to-host decryption processes. Since (as a mathematic
rule) host-to-host decryption processes unequivocally rely upon proper application of applicable
encryption keys, answering the research question devised for this thesis project necessarily rests
on the retrieval and correct utilization of encryption keys stored in the AP.
Encryption Key Retrieval
The AP designed into the prototype network topology secures its stored encryption keys
using authentication and authorization methods based on user name and password verification.
Upon inputting correct login credentials, authorized collection of encryption keys merely
requires secure navigation to the AP's embedded settings page responsible for delimiting the
network encryption key.
Encryption Key Application
After acquiring the AP's network encryption key, the NTCN will load the encryption key
into Wireshark but only after Wireshark rebuilds the network capture file originally
created using tcpdump. Bejtlich (2005) and Orebaugh (2006) outlined basic implementations
of tcpdump and Wireshark (respectively), although some configuration specifics relative to
the prototype network designed for this research project necessitated modification to their
rudimentary implementations.
Appendix C enumerates the configuration for each device incorporated into the prototype
network topology constructed for this research project. In addition to itemizing hardware
specification for N1, N2, the AP, and the NTCN, Appendix C also details the software tools
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(including encryption algorithm and key) and associated command syntax used to generate,
capture, and decode encrypted host-to-host network messages.

Data Analysis
Given that the ability for network surveillance and security specialists to successfully
encrypt/decrypt network messages hinges on the acquisition and application of appropriate
encryption algorithms and associated keys, the second procedural scenario devised for this
project represents a plausible, viable step towards answering the research question and resolving
the encryption dichotomy. Scenario 2 replicates an environment in which network security
administrators may deploy host-to-host encryption schemes for the purpose of thwarting
unauthorized eavesdropping but also confirms a procedure in which network security
professionals maintain the ability to successfully reverse the host-to-host encryption process
through measured retrieval of encryption keys.
Ability to A) retrieve encryption keys originally employed to created encrypted network
packets and B) apply the same encryption keys to properly decrypt encrypted network packets
captured in transit across a network topology serves as the primary method for answering the
thesis question and will support the eventual formulation of a viable framework for network
security professionals intent on resolving the encryption dichotomy. Actions A and B (above)
represent quantifiable steps in the maturation of an encryption/decryption framework if only
because inability on the part of legitimate, authorized network security administrators to
successfully reverse the host-to-host encryption process necessarily prevents meaningful
interpretation of network messages that, by unfortunate extension, obsoletes the need to move
forward with finalizing a viable framework.
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Chapter 5 – Results and Evaluation

Project Results – Scenario 1
Review of the network capture file generated by tcpdump using procedural governance
parameters established for Scenario 1 revealed the incontrovertible accuracy of the basic
deciphering formula (decryption = algorithm + keys). Figure 4 depicts the NTCN's
Wireshark rebuild of the encrypted, malicious network message (see packet number 279)
originating from N1 and destined for N2.

Figure 4: Node 1's encrypted network message as it appears to the Network Traffic Collection Node
without application of the original encryption key.
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The above figure illustrates the end result of N1 having transformed clear-text message
“I'm ready to install computer viruses!” (no quotes) into the following
cypher-text message prior to transmission across the prototype network topology:
856f324157c3fd82a54af2bc55d00dc6cf7c8a23523611e263cb16
eeb96d501f1df28cb26a7946a9969e52029a0a7607d8e15ecb8ea2
8c9e46695f2d8106ca553058cc0ee55040fd61be6c178bfd9b37fc
2ef82dcfd87cb7cdddf68e03f7cd7048199025eb76cbbbe9b4ce09
31fcad76028e3910bceab8ab29493681f7688b250fc0629121cdc4
342618058c4332
More importantly, without application of the original encryption key used by N1 to code its
message destined for N2, The NTCN (using Wireshark) could not properly decipher N1's
network message and reveal its malicious intent.

Project Results – Scenario 2
Review of the network capture file generated by tcpdump using procedural governance
parameters established for Scenario 2 further reinforced the basic deciphering formula
(decryption = algorithm + keys). Figure 5 (next page) depicts the NTCN's Wireshark rebuild
of N1's encrypted, malicious network message, but Figure 5 also depicts correct deciphering of
N1's encrypted, malicious network message (see packet number 279) through the NTCN's proper
application of the correct encryption algorithm and key!
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Figure 5: Node 1's encrypted network message as it appears to the Network Traffic Collection Node
with application of the original encryption key.

Meaningful decoding of N1's encrypted network message required administrative access
to the AP for the purpose of ascertaining its configured encryption algorithm and key that, by
extension, dictated how all nodes associated with the network converted clear-text messages into
cypher-text packets. With this critical information at its disposal, the NTCN meaningfully
deciphered N1's malicious network message.

Results Analysis
Inability of the NTCN to reverse N1's encryption process (as exemplified by Scenario 1)
resulted in indiscernible network messages. Encountered in production environments, such a
scenario would severely frustrate attempts on the part of network security professionals trying to
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uncover instances of malicious intent and execute subsequent courses of defensive action.
Scenario 1 results exactly replicate the ineffective network surveillance environment outlined in
Chapter 3 and serve to illustrate the serious risks associated with failure to resolve the encryption
dichotomy.
Conversely, ability of the NTCN to successfully reverse N1's encryption process (as
exemplified by Scenario 2) resulted in rapid discernment of N1's intent. Encountered in
production environments, such a scenario would afford network security professionals the
opportunity to execute courses of defensive action determined necessary to impede the
installation of computer viruses (or any other type of malicious activity). Scenario 2 results
exactly replicate the effective network surveillance environment outlined in Chapter 3 and,
ultimately, demonstrate the benefits associated with resolving the encryption dichotomy.

Results Interpretation
Analysis of critical hardware and software encryption components commonly deployed
across network topologies clearly demonstrates that proper access controls of encryption key
repository devices within an administrative domain make significant contributions towards
resolving the encryption dichotomy. When network security administrators maintain their ability
to securely collect and properly apply encryption algorithms and keys deployed across network
topologies, they can confidently employ host-to-host encryption schemes that insure only
authorized decoding of in-transit network packets.
Results from this thesis project indicate that a forthcoming framework for maintaining
defensibility in encrypted network environments must, at a minimum, include allowances for
proper device access and control across discrete administrative domains. Because encryption
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keys play such foundational roles in contemporary computer encryption/decryption algorithms,
network security professionals intent on resolving the encryption dichotomy must continuously
maintain administrative access to the device(s) – wherever their location and whatever their
configuration – responsible for storing host-to-host encryption keys.

Authorized Administrative Access
Organizations committed to preserving electronic asset security through the inclusion of
host-to-host encryption schemes must grant personnel responsible for conducting network
surveillance (and subsequent emergency response) authorized administrative access to
encryption key repository equipment. Depending on predetermined business rules adopted by
individual organizations, collecting encryption keys could be a simple matter of job-duty
assignment(s) or involve more complex invocations of an internal business process.
Even in the improbable (yet possible) event rogue hackers installed unauthorized key
repository hardware or seized unauthorized control of legitimate key repository equipment on a
given organization's network topology, the network engineering and administration team charged
with maintaining defensibility have the option of removing (or rebuilding) the compromised
devices simply because said devices fall within their jurisdictional domains. Decommissioning
unauthorized or compromised encryption key repository equipment necessarily prevents hackers
from using encryption keys external to administrative access of authorized network security team
members and re-establishes administrative supremacy of authorized network administrators
within their respective security domains.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion

Synopsis
The principle of visibility most applicably characterizes defensible, secure computer
networks. In visible network environments, administrative and surveillance personnel maintain
their continuous ability to meaningfully inspect individual message packets as they traverse
network topologies. Importantly, security professionals rely on meaningful inspection of
network messages to improve the efficiency at which they identify malicious activities and
execute defensive courses of action commensurate with perceived threats.
Preserving visibility in unencrypted network environments proves fairly straightforward,
but maintaining visibility in poorly conceived encrypted network architectures seriously
undermines even the most thoughtfully executed defensive efforts of network security
administrators. Encrypted network environments engineered and managed without consideration
for encryption key retrieval methods desperately inhibit the abilities of authorized professionals
to meaningfully inspect network packets for malicious activity thereby rendering their defensive
capabilities thoroughly useless.
While network security engineers and administrators that design and defend encrypted
network environments must plan for scenarios requiring proper decryption of coded host-to-host
messages, no cohesive framework currently exists upon which IT professionals may rely that
specifically addresses architecting such topologies. This thesis project contributes to a
forthcoming framework by demonstrating: A) analysis of critical hardware and software
encryption components commonly deployed across network topologies does, in fact, support
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host-to-host decryption processes, B) allowances for authorized access to encryption key
repository equipment substantially facilitates retrieval of encryption keys from critical hardware
and software encryption components, and C) the ability to decipher previously encrypted
network packets clearly improves the efficiency at which security professionals identify
malicious activity.
Measured and meaningful reversal of the host-to-host encryption process and subsequent
prescription of a critical framework parameter (i.e., authorized access to encryption key
repository equipment) represent worthwhile steps towards developing a framework for
maintaining defensibility in encrypted network environments. The successful formulation and
execution of at least one prototype scenario that resolved the encryption dichotomy accentuates
the prudence of moving forward to finalize a full-functioning encryption/decryption framework.

Futurecasting
Defensible problems manifested through the improper deployment of network encryption
schemes only intensify as computer network technology matures and organizations evolve. This
phenomenon has everything to do with the fact that the now-familiar Internet Protocol version 4
(IPv4) networking protocol – one of the core communications protocols that facilitates the
overwhelming majority of today's Internet traffic – is quickly reaching the end of its available
address space (Ford, 2010).
As an independent concept, diminished IPv4 address availability has very little impact on
security administrators managing defensible network topologies. However, when combined with
the fact that the next generation of Internet Protocol (IPv6) incorporates IPsec (a suite of
encryption protocols) as an integral part of its host-to-host communication process, the inevitable
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transition from IPv4 to IPv6 takes on monumentally greater significance. Whereas IPv4 affords
the option to incorporate IPsec into network communication schemes, IPv6 mandates its
inclusion (Frankel, 2010).
In such emerging environments, network security professionals that ignore resolution of
the encryption dichotomy jeopardize their individual contributions towards maintaining
defensible networks; moreover, failure to resolve the encryption dichotomy thwarts any given
organization's ability to evolve and seriously compete on a global scale. In these regards, failure
to resolve the encryption dichotomy 1) detrimentally impacts IT asset security and 2) hinders
competitive advantage and economic growth potential.

Future Research
Devising a working scenario and prescribing a line-item framework inclusion that
improves resolution of the encryption dichotomy represent only initial steps towards developing
a comprehensive framework for maintaining defensibility in encrypted network environments.
Potential topics for future research geared towards framework maturity include (but are not
limited to):
1. Best-practice policies and procedures for encryption key creation and rotation.
2. Security strategies (both logical and physical) for preserving robustness and
integrity of encryption key repository devices.
3. Internal business rules (likely based on the principle of separation of duties)
dictating whom may access encryption key repository equipment.
4. Internal business rules for best delimiting what events necessitate authorized
access of encryption keys to reverse the host-to-host encryption process.
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5. Legal ramifications possibly resulting from eavesdropping – even authorized
eavesdropping – on encrypted network traffic.
6. Practicality of encryption key retrieval methods to all levels of the OSI network
model.
7. Inclusion of asymmetric encryption methodologies.
8. Applicability to virtual computing environments.
Development of a full-functioning encryption/decryption will require contributions from
private business, government agencies, and academic institutions. Such an approach will insure
the greatest applicability to unique needs associated with diverse IT industry segments.

Conclusion
Network defensibility without consideration for network visibility results in wholly
ineffectual network security. Otherwise defensible network architectures that fail to resolve the
encryption dichotomy axiomatically increase IT asset vulnerability if only because security
professionals lose effective visibility of device communications.
The ability to meaningfully inspect every network packet that traverses a given IT
topology constitutes a key characteristic of visible network architectures. Network security
engineers and administrators that design and maintain encrypted network environments must
plan for inevitable instances where IT asset security hinges on the ability to successfully decrypt
previously encrypted host-to-host network messages, meaningfully ascertain malicious intent,
and launch effective courses of defensive action.
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Appendix A

Converting Clear Text Into Cypher Text
Although the US federal government first adopted the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
in 1974 (Mel, 2001), individual consumers, private retailers, and financial institutions of all
shapes and sizes continue to rely on DES and its matured variants (like 3DES) to protect banking
transactions totaling trillions of dollars (PCI, 2009). Similarly, common network security
protocols and architectures (e.g., IPsec and Kerberos) rely on DES variants to defend against
effective eavesdropping of network traffic payloads (Frankel, 2005 & Garman, 2003,
respectively).
Unfortunately, just as legitimate network users and administrators rely on DES to protect
authentic communications, so too can malicious attackers use DES to hide and protect their
criminal activities. The following steps explain the process evoked to obfuscate the malicious,
clear-text message introduced in Table 1 into cypher text using the DES algorithm.
Step 1:
In order to encrypt "I'm ready to install computer viruses!" (no
quotes) using the web-based DES encryption/decryption tool offered by Eugene Styer (n.d.), the
original message had to be segmented into packets 64 bits (or 8 ASCII characters) in length (no
more, no less). Spaces (delimited as <space> in Table 6) represent one and only one ASCII
character value and were sometimes used to pad packets in order to satisfy strict packet length
requirements of Styer's web-based tool. In the interest of future replication, the web-based tool
was configured as follows:
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1.

Input message = ASCII

2.

DES encryption key = 3b3898371520f75e (hexadecimal value)

3.

DES encryption key = 00111011 00111000 10011000

00110111 00010101 00100000 11110111 01011110 (non
configurable binary value)
4.
Packet Order
First Packet

Output message = Hexadecimal
Input Packet Payload

Resulting Binary Value

(8 ASCII characters)

(non-encrypted)

I'm<space>read

Second Packet y<space>to<space>ins
Third Packet
Fourth Packet
Fifth Packet

01001001 00100111 01101101 00100000
01110010 01100101 01100001 01100100
01111001 00100000 01110100 01101111
00100000 01101001 01101110 01110011

tall<space>com

01110100 01100001 01101100 01101100
00100000 01100011 01101111 01101101

puter<space>vi

01110000 01110101 01110100 01100101
01110010 00100000 01110110 01101001

ruses!<space><space>

01110010 01110101 01110011 01100101
01110011 00100001 00100000 00100000

Table 6: The malicious network message introduced in Table 1 properly segmented then correctly converted to
binary values

IMPORTANT: The resulting binary values delimited in Table 6, column 3 do not constitute
encrypted messages. Step 1 merely represents the conversion of alpha-numeric characters
(ASCII code) best recognized by humans into binary values (1s and 0s) best recognized by
computers. Because XOR-ing operations technically work against individual computer bits (i.e.,
1s and 0s) in network packets, converting ASCII characters to binary values improves
clarification of the XOR process explained in Appendix B.
Step 2:
With message packets correctly segmented to conform to strict tool requirements, the
web-based tool then ran each packet through a DES encryption engine using the DES encryption
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key notated above (3b3898371520f75e). Because of pre-selected configuration parameters
(see above), the web-based tool output each encrypted packet in hexadecimal notation.
Packet
Order

Packet Payload
(Binary values from Step 1)

Operation DES Encryption
Resulting
Key
Hexadecimal Value
(encrypted)

First
Packet

01001001 00100111 01101101
00100000 01110010 01100101
01100001 01100100

XOR

Second
Packet

01111001 00100000 01110100
01101111 00100000 01101001
01101110 01110011

XOR

Third
Packet

01110100 01100001 01101100
01101100 00100000 01100011
01101111 01101101

XOR

Fourth
Packet

01110000 01110101 01110100
01100101 01110010 00100000
01110110 01101001

XOR

3b3898371520f75e
3b3898371520f75e
3b3898371520f75e
3b3898371520f75e

bb9ca9aa479de85c
b80397ebe29742f6
7163182e01941f1c
05b59a4469632c6e

01110010 01110101 01110011
3b3898371520f75e
01100101 01110011 00100001
XOR
cc869012ba3d0462
00100000 00100000
Table 7: The malicious network message introduced in Table 1 XOR-ed against the DES encryption key introduced
in Table 2. The resulting message is fully encrypted.

Fifth
Packet

IMPORTANT: The resulting hexadecimal values delimited in Table 7, column 5 constitute
encrypted messages, because they were XOR-ed against an encryption key using the Feistel
function that serves as the primary XOR engine of the DES algorithm (Forouzan, 2008).
Step 3:
Finally, all encrypted hexadecimal values from each packet (as notated in column 5 of
Table 7) were then combined into one hexadecimal string such that the clear-text message "I'm
ready to install computer viruses!" (no quotes) became the encrypted message:
bb9ca9aa479de85c b80397ebe29742f6 7163182e01941f1c
05b59a4469632c6e cc869012ba3d0462.
Tables 4 & 5:

NETWORK ENCRYPTION FRAMEWORK

47

Due to configuration restrictions embedded in the web-based tool utilized to complete
steps 1 through 3 in this appendices, the DES encryption key originally used to scramble the
clear-text message could not be altered. Consequently, a different encryption key using a simple
XOR function (in the case of Table 4) and the same encryption key using a simple AND function
(in the case of Table 5) were employed to illustrate how variations to either the encryption key or
the mathematic operation necessarily result in indiscernible, worthless messages during the
decryption process.
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Appendix B

XOR Operations
Computer scientists and computer programmers rely on Exclusive OR (XOR) operations
to determine the disjunction between two operands. In the case of the malicious network
message introduced in Table 1, one operand equals the clear-text message (I'm ready to
install computer viruses!) and the second operand equals the DES encryption key
(3b3898371520f75e). Although the following explanation oversimplifies the XOR engine
embedded in DES, it accurately demonstrates (without too much imagination) how XOR-ing a
clear-text message against an encryption key results in cypher text.
Technically, XOR operations compare bit values of two different operands using the
following truth table:
First bit value

Operand

Second bit value

Truth Result

1

XOR

1

0

1

XOR

0

1

0

XOR

1

1

0

XOR

0

0

Table 8: Exclusive OR (XOR) truth table

Step 1:
Start with a simple clear-text ASCII message. To simplify this explanation, the word
“computer” (no quotes) serves as the clear text message (or first operand).
computer

Step 2:
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Convert the clear text message into its binary equivalent. This step facilitates bit
comparison as required by the above XOR truth table.
Computer = 01100011 01101111 01101101 01110000 01110101 01110100
01100101 01110010

Step 3:
Convert the encryption key (or second operand) into its binary equivalent. As with Step
2, this step facilitates bit comparison as required by the above XOR truth table:
3b3898371520f75e = 00111011 00111000 10011000 00110111 00010101
00100000 11110111 01011110

Step 4:
Use the above XOR truth table to arrive at the binary results of having operated the cleartext message against the encryption key.
Text:

01100011 01101111 01101101 01110000 01110101 01110100 01100101 01110010

Key:

00111011 00111000 10011000 00110111 00010101 00100000 11110111 01011110

Result:01011000 01010111 11110101 01000111 01100000 01010100 10010010 00101100

Step 5:
Convert the binary result from Step 4 (highlighted above) back into ASCII clear text.
XwõG`TO,

At this point, the original clear-text message as been “encrypted” into a meaningless
message. Only a person (or computer) with access to the original, unadulterated encryption key
could easily reverse the steps detailed above to revert back to the original, intelligible clear-text
message.
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Appendix C

Prototype Network Specifications
Tables 9 through 11 (below) detail the hardware and software specifications for each
device incorporated into the prototype network topology. Importantly, Node 1, Node 2, and the
Network Traffic Collection Node include hardware (e.g., IBM and Intel) and software (e.g.,
Microsoft Windows and Ubuntu Linux) IT solutions common to wide varieties of private
corporations, public organizations, and government agencies.
Nodes 1 & 2:
Node 1 System Summary

Node 2 System Summary

Manufacturer

IBM

IBM

Model #

T42 Type 2373

T42 Type 2373

System serial #

99FR34Z

L388G13

System board serial #

J1X6N4AF1VJ

VJ0BU5C619R

BIOS version

3.23 (1RETDRWW)

3.23 (1RETDRWW)

BIOS date

2007-06-18

2007-06-18

OS

Microsoft Windows XP

Microsoft Windows XP

OS version

5.10.2600 Service Pack 3

5.10.2600 Service Pack 3

Processor

x86 Family 6 Model 13 Stepping 6 x86 Family 6 Model 13 Stepping 6

Main memory

2096 mb

2096 mb

Drive type & size

Fixed; 80 gb

Fixed; 80 gb

Network device

Atheros 11a/b/g Wireless LAN
Mini PCI Adapter

Intel PRO/1000 MT Mobile
Connection

Network driver version 4.1.2.156

8.10.3.0

Network hardware
address

00:05:4e:48:9b:0c

00:13:e8:03:da:4b

Network logical
address (DHCP)

192.168.1.3

192.168.1.5
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Computer network
name
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Configuration Notes:
1. All Microsoft Windows “High Priority” and “Hardware” updates confirmed current via
Windows Update manager (as of March 19, 2011).
2. No reported errors in Device Manager.
3. Embedded firewall disabled; no anti-virus software installed.
4. Microsoft's “Messenger Service” enabled to facilitate host-to-host network communication.
5. DOS network message command syntax (from Node 1 to Node 2) : net send NODE2
“I'm ready to install computer viruses!”
Table 9: Detailed specifications for Node 1 and Node 2 incorporated into the prototype network topology.

Access Point:
Access Point (AP) System Summary
Manufacturer

Actiontec

Model #

Q1000

System serial #

CVAA9202505823

Firmware version #

QA02-31.10L.48

Network hardware address

00:24:7b:e2:6b:e0

Network logical address

192.168.1.1

DHCP server

Enabled

SSID

Regis

Encryption protocol

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

Encryption key

3b38983715

Table 10: Detailed specifications for the Access Point incorporated into the prototype network topology .

Network Traffic Collection Node:
Network Traffic Collection Node (NTCN) System Summary
Manufacturer

Asus

Model #

EEEPC901-BK001

System serial #

87OAAQ354129

BIOS version

2103

BIOS date

06/11/09
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OS

Ubuntu Linux 9.04; GNOME 2.26.1

Kernel version

2.6.29-1-netbook

Processor

Intel Atom CPU N270 x 2

Main memory

2006 mb

Swap space

1309 mb

Drive type & size

Fixed; 32 gb

Network device

RaLink RT2860

Network hardware address

00:15:af:ca:fd:1e

Network logical address
(DHCP)

Set to monitor mode; no IP address assigned
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Configuration Notes:
1. Update Manager confirmed all installed packages current (as of March 19, 2011).
2. Tcpdump 3.9.8-4ubunut installed.
3. Wireshark 1.0.7 installed.
4. UNIX command syntax to capture network packets: tcpdump -n -i ra0 -s 0 -w
<capture.file.name>
5. Wireshark application of network encryption key:
Step A: Open > capture.file.name
Step B: Edit > Preferences > Protocols > IEEE 802.11 > insert.encryption.key
Table 11: Detailed specification for the Network Traffic Collection Node incorporated into the prototype network
topology.

